英国华威大学Essay代写:为什么关税优于配额?

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进口配额可能导致行政腐败。假设目前对进口印度板球蝙蝠没有限制,每年在美国销售30,000只。出于某种原因,美国决定每年只售出5000只印度板球蝙蝠。他们可以设定5000的进口配额来达到这个目标。问题是,他们如何决定哪些5000只蝙蝠进入,哪些25,000不进入?政府现在必须告诉一些进口商,他们的板球蝙蝠将进入该国并告诉其他进口商,而不是他的不会。这给了海关官员很大的权力,因为他们现在可以访问受欢迎的公司,并且拒绝访问那些不受欢迎的人。这可能会导致有进口配额国家的严重腐败问题,因为选择满足配额的进口商是那些能够为海关官员提供最多优惠的人。关税制度可以达到同样的目标,而不存在腐败的可能性。关税设定在导致板球蝙蝠价格上涨的水平,使板球蝙蝠的需求量每年下降到5000美元。虽然关税控制着货物的价格,但由于供求关系的影响,它们间接控制了该货物的销售量。

英国华威大学Essay代写:为什么关税优于配额?

Import quotas can lead to administrative corruption. Suppose that there is currently no restriction on importing Indian cricket bats and 30,000 are sold in the U.S. each year. For some reason, the United States decides that they only want 5,000 Indian cricket bats sold per year. They could set an import quota at 5,000 to achieve this objective. The problem is—how do they decide which 5,000 bats get in and which 25,000 do not? The government now has to tell some importer that their cricket bats will be let into the country and tell some other importer than his will not be. This gives the customs officials a lot of power, as they can now give access to favored corporations and deny access to those who are not favored. This can cause a serious corruption problem in countries with import quotas, as the importers chosen to meet the quota are the ones who can provide the most favors to the customs officers. A tariff system can achieve the same objective without the possibility of corruption. The tariff is set at a level which causes the price of the cricket bats to rise just enough so that the demand for cricket bats falls to 5,000 per year. Although tariffs control the price of a good, they indirectly control the quantity sold of that good due to the interaction of supply and demand.

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